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Many	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠdie	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠwaiting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠtransplants	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠusable	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠfar	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtransplant.	 ﾠGovernments	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdevised	 ﾠmany	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠ
aimed	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ increasing	 ﾠ available	 ﾠ transplant	 ﾠ organs	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ variable	 ﾠ success.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ However,	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ few	 ﾠ
exceptions,	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠmakers	 ﾠare	 ﾠreluctant	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠfor	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
mutually	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠexchanges.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠask	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠcould	 ﾠsave	 ﾠlives.	 ﾠ	 ﾠControlled	 ﾠ
laboratory	 ﾠmethods	 ﾠare	 ﾠideal	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinquiry	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠlives	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
implementing	 ﾠfield	 ﾠtrials.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠresults	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠcan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠ
available	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ transplant,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ design	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
carefully	 ﾠ considered.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ However,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ increased	 ﾠ supply	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ transplantable	 ﾠ organs	 ﾠ derives	 ﾠ
disproportionately	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoor.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexogenously	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠto	 ﾠkeep	 ﾠ
one’s	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwith	 ﾠequitable	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠrates	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠlevels.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠIntroduction	 ﾠ
Advances	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ medical	 ﾠ technology	 ﾠ enable	 ﾠ human	 ﾠ organs	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ transplanted	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ
person	 ﾠto	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMany	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠtransplant	 ﾠare	 ﾠnow	 ﾠfairly	 ﾠroutine	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsave	 ﾠ
thousands	 ﾠof	 ﾠlives	 ﾠeach	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠface	 ﾠchronic	 ﾠshortages	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
organs	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ transplant.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ United	 ﾠ States	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ 80,000	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ kidney	 ﾠ
transplant	 ﾠare	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠwaiting	 ﾠlist	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠdonor	 ﾠkidney.
1	 ﾠDeceased	 ﾠdonors	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
transplant	 ﾠorgans,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠkidneys	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠliving	 ﾠdonors	 ﾠ(usually	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠmembers)	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠan	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwaiting.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠdata	 ﾠwas	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠcollected	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1988,	 ﾠ
demand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠkidneys	 ﾠhas	 ﾠgrown	 ﾠfar	 ﾠmore	 ﾠquickly	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdonor	 ﾠsupply.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠin	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠ4000	 ﾠAmericans	 ﾠdied	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwaiting	 ﾠlist	 ﾠfor	 ﾠkidney	 ﾠtransplants,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠpatients	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdie	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠwaiting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠother	 ﾠorgans.
2	 ﾠ
Societies	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ grappling	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ reduce	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ shortage	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ transplantable	 ﾠ organs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Cynowiec,	 ﾠet	 ﾠal	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠwill	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠheavily	 ﾠon	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
increasing	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠsupply.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠas	 ﾠpointed	 ﾠout	 ﾠby	 ﾠSurman,	 ﾠet	 ﾠal	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠinsufficient	 ﾠ
data	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠsolid	 ﾠfoundation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠJasper,	 ﾠet	 ﾠal	 ﾠ(2004)	 ﾠand	 ﾠHaddow	 ﾠ(2006)	 ﾠ
report	 ﾠsurveys	 ﾠof	 ﾠUS	 ﾠmedical	 ﾠprofessionals’	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠScottish	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠpublic’s	 ﾠviews	 ﾠon	 ﾠusing	 ﾠ
various	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐monetary	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠto	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠdonation,	 ﾠrespectively,	 ﾠand	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
find	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmany	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthey	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeffective.	 ﾠ	 ﾠJasper	 ﾠet	 ﾠal	 ﾠ(2004)	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠ“nothing	 ﾠshort	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠtest	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠ
conclusively	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠdonated	 ﾠorgans.”(p.	 ﾠ384)	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠrely	 ﾠupon	 ﾠexperimental	 ﾠmethods	 ﾠto	 ﾠtest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠfor	 ﾠorgans.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠargued	 ﾠby	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠ(1994)	 ﾠcontrolled	 ﾠlaboratory	 ﾠexperiments	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠto	 ﾠevaluate	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠ proposals.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Specifically,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ model	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ incentives	 ﾠ faced	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ donors	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ recipients	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
explore	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠfor	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgans.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠtest	 ﾠ1)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlifesaving	 ﾠeffectiveness	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcost	 ﾠ(repugnance)	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠtransfer,	 ﾠ2)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
solution	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠshortage,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ3)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistributional	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠinterventions.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
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1	 ﾠStatistic	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠUS	 ﾠDept.	 ﾠof	 ﾠHealth	 ﾠand	 ﾠHuman	 ﾠServices	 ﾠ(http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/rptData.asp)	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠhttp://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB119490273908090431.html	 ﾠlaboratory	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠin	 ﾠneed	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠ
providers,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ wealth	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ agent.	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ begin	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ system	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ “presumed	 ﾠ consent”	 ﾠ
voluntary	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠagents	 ﾠmay	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠdonating	 ﾠor	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ
repugnance	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ ethical	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ transferring	 ﾠ organs,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ implement	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ lottery	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ
potential	 ﾠpayoff.
3	 ﾠThis	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠis	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexchanging	 ﾠorgans.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcomparing	 ﾠ
situations	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ lottery,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ directly	 ﾠ evaluate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ effects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ induced	 ﾠ
opportunity	 ﾠcost	 ﾠfor	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠor	 ﾠsales.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
organs	 ﾠwill	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠwe	 ﾠreplicate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠwith	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ eliminating	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ lottery	 ﾠ increases	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ lives	 ﾠ saved	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ organ	 ﾠ
donation	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠbaseline,	 ﾠpresumed	 ﾠconsent	 ﾠcondition;	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
actually	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeath	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeath	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbaseline	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠinsufficient	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠand	 ﾠinsufficient	 ﾠsupply.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠeliminating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠsolves	 ﾠboth	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠproblems,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠonly	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠsupply.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ11%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠin	 ﾠneed	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
organ	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠunable	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠone	 ﾠat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠprice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠtreatment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠfind	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffectiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠthan	 ﾠindicated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeath	 ﾠ
rate	 ﾠstatistics	 ﾠalone.	 ﾠA	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠand	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠthinness	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ deaths	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ treatment,	 ﾠ highlighting	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ importance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ
institution	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcritics	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
organ	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ suggested,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ organ	 ﾠ sales	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ primarily	 ﾠ undertaken	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ poor	 ﾠ
subjects.	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠalso	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠa	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐experiment	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠto	 ﾠgauge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviews	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠrespondents	 ﾠ
regarding	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠand	 ﾠdonations	 ﾠand	 ﾠask	 ﾠif	 ﾠthese	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠcorrelate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠ
behavior	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOverwhelmingly,	 ﾠour	 ﾠrespondents	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsupportive	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoluntary	 ﾠ
organ	 ﾠdonation,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠCatholic	 ﾠrespondents	 ﾠwere	 ﾠless	 ﾠsupportive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠrespondents	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠindifferent	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompensating	 ﾠdonors	 ﾠor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfamilies,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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3	 ﾠClearly	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠactually	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠfeelings,	 ﾠdesperate	 ﾠneeds,	 ﾠand	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠ
donation,	 ﾠsales	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransplantation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlab	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠactually	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠfor	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠ(something	 ﾠIRB	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
allow).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinduced	 ﾠcost	 ﾠis	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠto	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠtransplantation.	 ﾠ“selling	 ﾠorgans.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠReported	 ﾠopinions	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠand	 ﾠdonations	 ﾠwere	 ﾠuncorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
donations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠwho	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsupportive	 ﾠof	 ﾠselling	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproceeds	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Background	 ﾠ
Many	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠsolutions	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠshortage	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsuggested,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnone	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
controversial	 ﾠas	 ﾠpermitting	 ﾠa	 ﾠ(regulated)	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠfor	 ﾠorgans.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1960s,	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠnewspapers	 ﾠ
began	 ﾠprinting	 ﾠadvertisements	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠlive	 ﾠdonors	 ﾠattempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠkidneys,	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
prospect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ human	 ﾠ organs	 ﾠ (Dukeminier	 ﾠ Jr.,	 ﾠ 1970).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ 1983,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ former	 ﾠ
physician,	 ﾠDr.	 ﾠH.	 ﾠBarry	 ﾠJacobs	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrokerage	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠkidneys	 ﾠin	 ﾠVirginia,	 ﾠopening	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
debate	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ United	 ﾠ States	 ﾠand	 ﾠ sparking	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ outrage.	 ﾠ Within	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ year,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ federal	 ﾠ law	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ
passed	 ﾠto	 ﾠban	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsale	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠand	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcompany	 ﾠwas	 ﾠshuttered	 ﾠ(S.H.D.	 ﾠ1985).
4	 ﾠRoth	 ﾠ
(2007)	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“repugnance”	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠtransactions	 ﾠstems	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠopposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
objectification	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcoercion,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpermitting	 ﾠone	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
problematic	 ﾠ transaction	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ door	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ host	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ others.	 ﾠ Whether	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ objection	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
grounded	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividualized	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠcode,	 ﾠshared	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠheritage,	 ﾠor	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠcreed,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠregard	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbuying	 ﾠand	 ﾠselling	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody	 ﾠas	 ﾠtaboo.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠuphold	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠcode	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
maintain	 ﾠ purity,	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ willing	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ rule	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ possibility	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ beneficial	 ﾠ
transactions	 ﾠ(Durkheim	 ﾠ1976,	 ﾠBelk	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ1989).	 ﾠ
Despite	 ﾠ others’	 ﾠ strong	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ objections,	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ proponents	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ kidney	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
argued	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ providing	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ incentives	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ supply	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ transplant	 ﾠ kidneys	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ
alleviate	 ﾠshortages	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupplement	 ﾠkidneys	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠaltruistic	 ﾠdonors	 ﾠ(Arrow	 ﾠ1972,	 ﾠPerry	 ﾠ
1980,	 ﾠS.H.D.	 ﾠ1985,	 ﾠMahoney	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠBecker	 ﾠand	 ﾠElias	 ﾠ2007).	 ﾠOpponents	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠin	 ﾠkidneys	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommoditization	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠmay	 ﾠactually	 ﾠcrowd	 ﾠout	 ﾠaltruistic	 ﾠmotivations	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠdecrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠquantity	 ﾠsupplied	 ﾠ(Titmuss	 ﾠ1971,	 ﾠSinger	 ﾠ1973,	 ﾠDeJong	 ﾠet	 ﾠal	 ﾠ1995,	 ﾠ
Byrne	 ﾠand	 ﾠThompson	 ﾠ2001).	 ﾠAdditionally,	 ﾠopponents	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠtime-ﾭ‐inconsistent	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠand	 ﾠregret	 ﾠ(Byrne	 ﾠand	 ﾠThompson	 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠSatz	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠ
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4	 ﾠIndia	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1980s	 ﾠand	 ﾠearly	 ﾠ1990s	 ﾠand	 ﾠIran	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ1988	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ(Becker	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Elias	 ﾠ2007)	 ﾠSome	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ highlight	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ negative	 ﾠ distributional	 ﾠ consequences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ kidney	 ﾠ sales	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
pointing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠsales	 ﾠare	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠdesperate	 ﾠ(Archard	 ﾠ2002,	 ﾠBorna	 ﾠ1987).
5,6	 ﾠ
Of	 ﾠthose	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠsolutions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshortage	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransplantable	 ﾠorgans,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
argue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠobtained	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaltruism	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
potential	 ﾠdonors	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkidney	 ﾠshortage	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠalleviated	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠ improving	 ﾠ procurement	 ﾠ efforts	 ﾠ (Prottas	 ﾠ 1983,	 ﾠ Thorne	 ﾠ 1998,	 ﾠ Healy	 ﾠ 2004).	 ﾠ There	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
empirical	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“presumed	 ﾠconsent”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdonation,	 ﾠa	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠregime	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠpresumed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠdonate	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠupon	 ﾠdeath	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthey	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠ
otherwise,	 ﾠ increases	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ available	 ﾠ supply	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ kidneys.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ successfully	 ﾠ
adopted	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain,	 ﾠPortugal	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustria	 ﾠ(Abadie	 ﾠand	 ﾠGay,	 ﾠ2006,	 ﾠMossialos	 ﾠet	 ﾠal,	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
United	 ﾠStates	 ﾠrelies	 ﾠupon	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“informed	 ﾠconsent”	 ﾠor	 ﾠopt-ﾭ‐in	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdeceased	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠdonation;	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠall	 ﾠcadaveric	 ﾠkidneys	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmade	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtransplant,	 ﾠa	 ﾠshortage	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
remain,	 ﾠhighlighting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠ(Israni	 ﾠet	 ﾠal,	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠBeard	 ﾠet	 ﾠal,	 ﾠ
2006).	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠTetlock	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2000),	 ﾠand	 ﾠTetlock	 ﾠ(2003)	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠare	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠtaboo	 ﾠtrade-ﾭ‐offs	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstrongly-ﾭ‐held	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
indicates	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ incentives	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ overcome	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ objections	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ donation.	 ﾠ Hence,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ
design	 ﾠa	 ﾠstylized	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinduces	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessity	 ﾠand	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠ
transfer	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠtest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠto	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠshortages.	 ﾠ
Experimental	 ﾠDesign	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠ explore	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ impact	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ organs,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ employ	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ partial	 ﾠ 2x2	 ﾠ within-ﾭ‐subjects	 ﾠ
experimental	 ﾠdesign.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠ
dimension	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠnot	 ﾠretaining	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠorgan.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBaseline	 ﾠ
environment,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠfor	 ﾠorgans,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdonate	 ﾠthem	 ﾠand	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠHypothetical	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠin	 ﾠHalpern	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
willingness	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠor	 ﾠdonate	 ﾠkidneys	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠother	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠown	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠkidney	 ﾠfailure,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠoffered,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecipient	 ﾠare	 ﾠdominant.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠbelow,	 ﾠour	 ﾠresults	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠ
involve	 ﾠreal	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠincentives,	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠmay	 ﾠmatter.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠHarvey	 ﾠ(1990)	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠtransfers	 ﾠfor	 ﾠorgans,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmiddleman	 ﾠprofiting	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠanother	 ﾠindividual.	 ﾠ	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠnot	 ﾠretaining	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠafter	 ﾠdeath.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcost	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
meant	 ﾠto	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠsome	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠopposition	 ﾠ(religious,	 ﾠethical,	 ﾠdisgust,	 ﾠetc.)	 ﾠto	 ﾠseparating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
organ	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠits	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠowner.
7	 ﾠ	 ﾠSpecifically,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdonate	 ﾠor	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠentered	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpays	 ﾠ$100	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ0.001	 ﾠchance	 ﾠand	 ﾠ0	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ0.999	 ﾠchance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
expected	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdime	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk-ﾭ‐averse	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠwill	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠit	 ﾠeven	 ﾠless.
8	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠ
theopportunity	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠis	 ﾠlow,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠsome	 ﾠchance	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠreward.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Each	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠparticipates	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠBaseline	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠpresumed	 ﾠconsent	 ﾠ(opt-ﾭ‐
out)	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠbest-ﾭ‐case	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠsituation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
subjects	 ﾠthen	 ﾠparticipates	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠtreatments	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠto	 ﾠcoincide	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
potential	 ﾠsolutions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransplanted	 ﾠorgans.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠthat	 ﾠallows	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠorgans;	 ﾠwhile,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
eliminate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠdonating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠ(that	 ﾠis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠor	 ﾠdonate).	 ﾠ	 ﾠCreating	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠcompensates	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠallow	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
transplanted,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠremoving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
lottery	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠtransplanted.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEither	 ﾠ
treatment	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ expected	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ organs	 ﾠ offered	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ transplant.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
experiments	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠwere	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠas	 ﾠassets	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠbias	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠbehavior;	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠterms	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“Poor,”	 ﾠ“Wealthy,”	 ﾠ“Young”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“Old”	 ﾠwere	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠaid	 ﾠ
subjects	 ﾠin	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠas	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠeach	 ﾠlaboratory	 ﾠsession	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠten	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠwho	 ﾠinteract	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠoverlapping	 ﾠgenerations	 ﾠ
framework	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠlive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠperiods.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠthree	 ﾠ“Young”	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠand	 ﾠthree	 ﾠ“Old”	 ﾠpeople.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠother	 ﾠsix	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠinactive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠthree	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwere	 ﾠinactive	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠ“Young,”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠOld,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwere	 ﾠOld	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ
period	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠinactive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠrepeats	 ﾠafter	 ﾠeach	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠissues	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠrepeated	 ﾠplay	 ﾠgames,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠOld	 ﾠperson	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinactive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠone	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠreturning	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠIf	 ﾠour	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠlive	 ﾠdonors,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠmechanism.	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠPrevious	 ﾠexperimental	 ﾠwork	 ﾠhas	 ﾠroutinely	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠbehave	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠaverse	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠHolt	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Laury	 ﾠ2002;	 ﾠGoeree	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2003	 ﾠand	 ﾠCox	 ﾠet	 ﾠal	 ﾠ1982).	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomy,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠinactive	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠis	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠgeneration,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠother	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠacross	 ﾠlives.
9	 ﾠ
Each	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠliving	 ﾠperson	 ﾠholds	 ﾠa	 ﾠuseable	 ﾠasset	 ﾠthey	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecified	 ﾠpayment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠeconomy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠare	 ﾠ“Wealthy”	 ﾠand	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
“Poor.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠa	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$8	 ﾠfor	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠuseable	 ﾠasset	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
Young	 ﾠand	 ﾠ$5	 ﾠfor	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠuseable	 ﾠasset	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠOld.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠa	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
$2	 ﾠfor	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠuseable	 ﾠasset	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠand	 ﾠ$5	 ﾠfor	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠuseable	 ﾠasset	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠare	 ﾠOld.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠboth	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠand	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠuseable	 ﾠasset	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠOld	 ﾠand	 ﾠincome	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgains	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠan	 ﾠasset	 ﾠis	 ﾠdonated	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
traded.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠof	 ﾠas	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠincome	 ﾠvariation	 ﾠis	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠ
productivity	 ﾠor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠother	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠexogenous	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperimental	 ﾠenvironment,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠOld	 ﾠ
subjects	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠof	 ﾠas	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠretired.	 ﾠ	 ﾠInactive	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠhold	 ﾠany	 ﾠassets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEach	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠremains	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠor	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠexperimental	 ﾠsession;	 ﾠthus	 ﾠgenerations	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠand	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠpeople.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠare	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠuseable	 ﾠassets:	 ﾠ	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠand	 ﾠgreen.	 ﾠ	 ﾠYellow	 ﾠassets	 ﾠlast	 ﾠfor	 ﾠone	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠ
Green	 ﾠassets	 ﾠlast	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠturning	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠand	 ﾠlasting	 ﾠone	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠassets	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠred	 ﾠassets,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$0	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠagent	 ﾠtypes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠnew	 ﾠgeneration,	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠborn	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnew	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠassets	 ﾠand	 ﾠone	 ﾠperson	 ﾠis	 ﾠborn	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
yellow	 ﾠasset.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEvery	 ﾠactive	 ﾠperson	 ﾠcan	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcolor	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠor	 ﾠher	 ﾠown	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠasset.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠno	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠOld	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwho	 ﾠowned	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠasset	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠan	 ﾠasset	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwas	 ﾠturning	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠand	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlast	 ﾠone	 ﾠmore	 ﾠperiod)	 ﾠcould	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠto	 ﾠeither	 ﾠ“Donate	 ﾠMy	 ﾠ
Asset”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠmy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠto	 ﾠdonate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset.
10	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠperson	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠa	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠasset	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ“Accept	 ﾠan	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠmy	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠThis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠmacroeconomics	 ﾠexperiments	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠoutlives	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠagents.	 ﾠ
See	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠLim	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(1994),	 ﾠMarimon	 ﾠand	 ﾠSunder	 ﾠ(1994),	 ﾠand	 ﾠMarimon	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(1993).	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠPrevious	 ﾠwork	 ﾠby	 ﾠSamuelson	 ﾠand	 ﾠZeckhauser	 ﾠ(1988)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠindentified	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“status	 ﾠquo	 ﾠbias”	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠchoice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpetus	 ﾠfor	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠdonor	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthey	 ﾠtake	 ﾠactive	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠto	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠdonor.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠAbadie	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠGay	 ﾠ(2006)	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransplantable	 ﾠorgans.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperimental	 ﾠ
design	 ﾠchoice,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠshould	 ﾠstrengthen	 ﾠany	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ“works”	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcompeting	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠ
“real-ﾭ‐world”	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠset	 ﾠup	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiment,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwere	 ﾠalways	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠOld	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠassets	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠlong	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠeither	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠdonated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠperson	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
following	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdonated	 ﾠasset	 ﾠand	 ﾠearn	 ﾠ$5.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
become	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecipient	 ﾠwas	 ﾠOld	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdonated	 ﾠ
again	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠgeneration.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠdonate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
payoff	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOld	 ﾠperson	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠperson	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmade.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
sense	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠare	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhappen	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOld	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠasset	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠhe	 ﾠor	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdied.
11	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlottery,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠselected	 ﾠ
“Keep	 ﾠmy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠhad	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchance	 ﾠto	 ﾠwin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠ$100	 ﾠby	 ﾠguessing	 ﾠan	 ﾠinteger	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ0	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
999.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠeach	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlottery,	 ﾠa	 ﾠwinning	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠuniform	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠ[0,	 ﾠ999]	 ﾠand	 ﾠannounced	 ﾠto	 ﾠeveryone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠchose	 ﾠto	 ﾠdonate	 ﾠor	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠan	 ﾠasset,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
did	 ﾠnot	 ﾠplay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠgive	 ﾠor	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠan	 ﾠasset	 ﾠas	 ﾠcould	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠrecipient	 ﾠwas	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠbut	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠdonated	 ﾠan	 ﾠasset	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠno	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠrecipient	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠdonation.	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠfor	 ﾠassets,	 ﾠOld	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠassets	 ﾠchose	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ“Sell	 ﾠ
my	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠmy	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠselected	 ﾠ“Sell	 ﾠmy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠthey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠenter	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠask	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ$0	 ﾠand	 ﾠ$5	 ﾠin	 ﾠcents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwith	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠassets	 ﾠchose	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
“Buy	 ﾠan	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠmy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠopted	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠan	 ﾠasset	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠenter	 ﾠa	 ﾠbid,	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ$0	 ﾠand	 ﾠ$5	 ﾠin	 ﾠcents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠno	 ﾠbid	 ﾠor	 ﾠno	 ﾠask	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠno	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
lowest	 ﾠask	 ﾠwas	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbid	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠagain	 ﾠno	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbid	 ﾠwas	 ﾠabove	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠask	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprice	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbid	 ﾠand	 ﾠask	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠperson	 ﾠbought	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
seller	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlowest	 ﾠask.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbid	 ﾠwas	 ﾠabove	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠasks	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠwas	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
average	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠasks	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠperson	 ﾠbought	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseller	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlowest	 ﾠ
ask.	 ﾠA	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwas	 ﾠineligible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠa	 ﾠbid	 ﾠor	 ﾠan	 ﾠask,	 ﾠregardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠwere	 ﾠactually	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEach	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
session	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠa	 ﾠsummary	 ﾠreport	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠbids,	 ﾠasks,	 ﾠor	 ﾠprices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdone	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠHence	 ﾠour	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠcreates	 ﾠa	 ﾠfutures	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠCohen	 ﾠ(1989)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠargument	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠ
futures	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠto	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠparticipants	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠaid	 ﾠprice	 ﾠconvergence	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
thin	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparties	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠrenegotiate.
12	 ﾠ
After	 ﾠcompleting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirections,	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠanswered	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomprehension	 ﾠquestions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠexperimenter	 ﾠwent	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanswers	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivately	 ﾠcorrected	 ﾠany	 ﾠmistakes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
subjects	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ answered	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ questions	 ﾠ correctly,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ experiment	 ﾠ began.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ After	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ periods	 ﾠ
(19complete	 ﾠgenerations)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbaseline	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcompleted,	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠwere	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ
additional	 ﾠinstructions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠ20	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
experiment	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ20
th	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠOld.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSubjects	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠin	 ﾠeither	 ﾠportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠnor	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ experiment	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ parts.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Copies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ directions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠc o m p r e h e n s i o n 	 ﾠ
questions	 ﾠare	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappendix.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
After	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiments	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcompleted,	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠanswered	 ﾠa	 ﾠweb-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠeliciting	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
opinions	 ﾠon	 ﾠdonating	 ﾠand	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupplied	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠdemographic	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
copy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠis	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappendix.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠall	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠhad	 ﾠcompleted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurvey,	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexperimental	 ﾠ“lives”	 ﾠwas	 ﾠrandomly	 ﾠselected,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠwere	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠbased	 ﾠupon	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠearnings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEach	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwas	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠin	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠdismissed	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
average	 ﾠ salient	 ﾠ payment	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ $9.41	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ experiment	 ﾠ lasted	 ﾠ approximately	 ﾠ 45minutes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Subjects	 ﾠalso	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠa	 ﾠ$5	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcompleting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠ$7	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠpayment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ80	 ﾠundergraduates	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠparticipated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
experiment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSome	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠhad	 ﾠpreviouslyparticipated	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠeconomics	 ﾠexperiments,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
none	 ﾠhad	 ﾠparticipated	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠstudies.	 ﾠ
Hypotheses	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ hypothesis	 ﾠ concerns	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ effects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Market	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ NoLotto	 ﾠ treatments	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
provision	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠto	 ﾠsick	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBaseline.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
increases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupplying	 ﾠan	 ﾠasset	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremoval	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠdecreases	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSpecific	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdramatic	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠFriedman	 ﾠ1993	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Coppinger	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ1980).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠ
market,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠcould	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransplantable	 ﾠorgans.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesigning	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠleft	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠresearch.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ marginal	 ﾠ cost,	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ treatments	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ provision	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ organs	 ﾠ relative	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Baseline.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠnaïve	 ﾠprediction	 ﾠbased	 ﾠupon	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐interest	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBaseline	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
lottery	 ﾠwill	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠzero	 ﾠdonations	 ﾠsince	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠmust	 ﾠgive	 ﾠup	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠgain	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
benefit	 ﾠto	 ﾠothers;	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠresults	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdictator	 ﾠgames	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠpart	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso	 ﾠyields	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠto	 ﾠothers.	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠratio	 ﾠof	 ﾠother’s	 ﾠ
gains	 ﾠto	 ﾠown	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠgrows,	 ﾠso	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamount	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ(Forsythe,	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ1994,	 ﾠAndreoni	 ﾠand	 ﾠMiller	 ﾠ
2002,	 ﾠand	 ﾠDeck	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠBased	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠpattern	 ﾠone	 ﾠwould	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠsomepeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
accept	 ﾠan	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠ$0.10	 ﾠloss	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠ$5.00	 ﾠgain	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecipient.Anyone	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠforgo	 ﾠ
$0.10	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ willing	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ donate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ asset	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ costless	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ so.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Therefore,	 ﾠ
donations	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠas	 ﾠfrequent	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBaseline.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠis	 ﾠintroduced,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupplier	 ﾠis	 ﾠcompensated	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠloss	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠexceed	 ﾠ$0.10.	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠanyone	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠincur	 ﾠa	 ﾠ$0.10	 ﾠloss	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠincur	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠ
loss	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠa	 ﾠgain	 ﾠto	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠanother	 ﾠperson,	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠas	 ﾠfrequent	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Market	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠBaseline.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠpertains	 ﾠto	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠpersistent	 ﾠincome	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠ
across	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠtest	 ﾠfor	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠof	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠethical	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠaddressed	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠof	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠorgans.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠwill	 ﾠact	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“undue	 ﾠinducement”	 ﾠencouraging	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
desperate	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisproportionately	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠconjecture	 ﾠis	 ﾠformalized	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠhypothesis:	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠtreatment,	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsale	 ﾠthan	 ﾠRich	 ﾠsubjects.	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠpredictions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠassets	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexchanged	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
environment	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠis	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠupon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
actions	 ﾠof	 ﾠothers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠold	 ﾠperson	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠforgo	 ﾠ$0.10	 ﾠto	 ﾠdonate	 ﾠan	 ﾠasset	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠdonor	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdonate	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠrecipient	 ﾠhas	 ﾠchosen	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
donation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠperson	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠforgo	 ﾠ$0.10	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠdonations	 ﾠif	 ﾠshe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
neither	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠdonor	 ﾠis	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠdonate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠthree	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠtreatments	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠselecting	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠNash	 ﾠEquilibrium.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠpure	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠ
equilibrium	 ﾠprice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠavoidable	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠto	 ﾠforgo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
lottery	 ﾠto	 ﾠenter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠstraightforward.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSince	 ﾠa	 ﾠseller	 ﾠcould	 ﾠearn	 ﾠ
$0.10	 ﾠby	 ﾠstaying	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠany	 ﾠseller	 ﾠmust	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠto	 ﾠearn	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ$0.10	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠplacing	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
ask.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠprice	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠ$0.10,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠprice	 ﾠabove	 ﾠ$0.10	 ﾠboth	 ﾠsellers	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠundercut	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrival.
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 ﾠ
Results:	 ﾠEffectiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheTreatments	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠdata	 ﾠconsist	 ﾠof	 ﾠ640	 ﾠsalient	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠand	 ﾠ320	 ﾠsalient	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ subjects	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ independent	 ﾠ sessions.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Half	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ observations	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Baseline	 ﾠ
condition,	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ fourth	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ observations	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Market	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ NoLotto	 ﾠ
treatments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperimental	 ﾠresults	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠfindings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠ
considers	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmetric	 ﾠof	 ﾠlives	 ﾠsaved.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Finding	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠreduces	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdie	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠBaseline.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdie	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠactually	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠ
treatment.	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ1	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠdisplays	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠsick	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠwho	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠby	 ﾠtreatment.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠ
inspection	 ﾠit	 ﾠappears	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBaseline	 ﾠthe,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠreduces	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
death	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠmarginally	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeath	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
supported	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠby	 ﾠmixed-ﾭ‐effectslogistic	 ﾠregression	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeight	 ﾠsessions	 ﾠare	 ﾠmodeled	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠ random	 ﾠ effects	 ﾠ (es)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ compute	 ﾠ treatment	 ﾠ effects	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ probability	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ death	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ
controlling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠPeriod.
14	 ﾠ	 ﾠSpecifically	 ﾠwe	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠequation	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbinary	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠ
variable	 ﾠis	 ﾠDeatht,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠequals	 ﾠ1	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsick	 ﾠperson	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠasset	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠt	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠotherwise.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Deatht	 ﾠ=	 ﾠα0+	 ﾠα1NoLotto	 ﾠ+	 ﾠα2Market	 ﾠ+	 ﾠα3Period	 ﾠ+	 ﾠε	 ﾠ+	 ﾠes	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ (1)	 ﾠ
NoLotto	 ﾠand	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠdichotomous	 ﾠdummy	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠindicating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
lottery	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠrespectively.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠleft	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠof	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ1	 ﾠreports	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠvan	 ﾠBoening	 ﾠand	 ﾠWilcox	 ﾠ(1996)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠwith	 ﾠavoidable	 ﾠcosts.	 ﾠ
14	 ﾠAll	 ﾠstatistics	 ﾠand	 ﾠgraphics	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠusing	 ﾠR:	 ﾠA	 ﾠLanguage	 ﾠand	 ﾠEnvironment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠStatistical	 ﾠComputing	 ﾠ(2009).	 ﾠ
Regressions	 ﾠcomputed	 ﾠusing	 ﾠHarrell	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠand	 ﾠWarnes	 ﾠ(2009).	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠresults.	 ﾠ	 ﾠConsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠour	 ﾠhypothesis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠon	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠis	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠindicating	 ﾠthat	 ﾠremoving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠassets	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠby	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠneed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠon	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠis	 ﾠnegative,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠinsignificant,	 ﾠindicating	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠassets	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsuccessfully	 ﾠ
transferred.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠeliminate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠshortage,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠencouraging.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠopening	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠfor	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠis	 ﾠsurprising	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
warrants	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠattention.	 ﾠSpecifically,	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtreatments	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
compare	 ﾠin	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeath	 ﾠacross	 ﾠtreatments.Deaths	 ﾠmay	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠis	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan,	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠis	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
exchange	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠupon.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcause	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
donations	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠset	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠterms	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠ0.	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠa	 ﾠdemanded	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠsick	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠchose	 ﾠ“Accept”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“Buy”	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠa	 ﾠsupplied	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Donate”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“Sell.”	 ﾠThus	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠdemanded	 ﾠ
organs	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠsick	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠchose	 ﾠ“Accept”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“Buy”,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠno	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠchose	 ﾠ“Donate”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“Sell.”	 ﾠ
Similarly,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠsupplied	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠchose	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Donate”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“Sell,”	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
potential	 ﾠrecipient	 ﾠchose	 ﾠ“Keep”.Table	 ﾠ2	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠsummary	 ﾠstatistics	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠtreatments	 ﾠ
indicating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠdied	 ﾠyoung,	 ﾠdemanded	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupplied	 ﾠ
organs	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠor	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠsupply.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
next	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtreatments	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠdemanded	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsupplied.	 ﾠ
Finding	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠDeaths	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBaseline	 ﾠresult	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠinsufficient	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠand	 ﾠdemand.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ column	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Table	 ﾠ 2,	 ﾠ note	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ 160	 ﾠ Baseline	 ﾠ treatment	 ﾠp e r i o d s ,	 ﾠ thesick	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ
demanded	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠ“Accept”)	 ﾠin	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ115	 ﾠinstances,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ72%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
87Baseline	 ﾠdeaths,	 ﾠ45,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ52%,	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠsick	 ﾠagent	 ﾠrefusing	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan.	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ behavior	 ﾠ somewhat	 ﾠ surprising,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ rationalized	 ﾠ depending	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
subject’s	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠand	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsupplied.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠ
side,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠhealthy,	 ﾠold	 ﾠagent	 ﾠchose	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Donate”	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠin	 ﾠ95/160	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠ(56%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime).	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ surprising,	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ aforementioned	 ﾠ evidence	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ dictator	 ﾠ
games,	 ﾠand	 ﾠone	 ﾠcould	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠutility	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrationalize	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠshortage	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthese	 ﾠconditions.Both	 ﾠ
insufficient	 ﾠ demand	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ insufficient	 ﾠ supply	 ﾠ contributed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ premature	 ﾠ deaths,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ ask	 ﾠ
which,	 ﾠif	 ﾠeither,	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfailures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtreatments	 ﾠsuccessfully	 ﾠaddressed.	 ﾠ
Finding	 ﾠ3:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠdemanded	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBaseline,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Market	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ 2(a)	 ﾠ shows	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ percent	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ periods	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ sick	 ﾠ subjects	 ﾠ demanded	 ﾠ organs	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
treatment.It	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠ
relative	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Baseline,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Market	 ﾠ treatment	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ conclusion	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ supported	 ﾠ
parametrically	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlogistic	 ﾠregression.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠbefore,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsessions	 ﾠare	 ﾠmodeled	 ﾠasrandom	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ fixed	 ﾠ effects	 ﾠ compute	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ impact	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ treatments,	 ﾠ controlling	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Period.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ
dependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠis	 ﾠDemandt,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠa	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠ
recipient	 ﾠ chose	 ﾠ “Accept”	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ “Buy”	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ t	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ otherwise.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ model	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
equation	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠare	 ﾠreported	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠof	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Demandt	 ﾠ=	 ﾠβ0	 ﾠ+	 ﾠβ1NoLotto	 ﾠ+	 ﾠβ2Market	 ﾠ+	 ﾠβ3Period	 ﾠ+	 ﾠε	 ﾠ+	 ﾠes	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ (2)	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠbefore,	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠand	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠdichotomous	 ﾠdummy	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠindicating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠrespectively.	 ﾠ	 ﾠApositive	 ﾠand	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠremoving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwillingness	 ﾠof	 ﾠsick	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
accept	 ﾠorgans.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠchange	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠsick	 ﾠagents	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlottery	 ﾠ(with	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ$0.10)	 ﾠat	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ$5.00,	 ﾠor	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsick	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠothers	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
donate	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠlottery.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠon	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠis	 ﾠpositive,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
insignificant,	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠthose	 ﾠin	 ﾠneed	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
organ	 ﾠto	 ﾠseek	 ﾠone.One	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠplace	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlottery,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
alternatively,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsick	 ﾠperson	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbelievethat	 ﾠprospective	 ﾠsellers	 ﾠare	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠprice.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠissues	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠFinding	 ﾠ4:	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠand	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠtreatments	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Baseline.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠquantity	 ﾠsupplied	 ﾠis	 ﾠnominally	 ﾠ(though	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstatistically)	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Market	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠtreatment.	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ2(b)	 ﾠdisplays	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsupplied.	 ﾠ	 ﾠClearly,	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠ treatments	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ supply	 ﾠ relative	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Baseline.	 ﾠ Again,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠm i x e d -ﾭ‐effectslogistic	 ﾠ
regression	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrandom	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsession	 ﾠis	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠcontrolling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Period	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ dichotomous	 ﾠ dummy	 ﾠ variables	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ treatments.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ dependent	 ﾠ variable	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
equation	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠis	 ﾠSupplyt,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ1	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠsupplied	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
period	 ﾠt	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠ0	 ﾠotherwise.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Supplyt	 ﾠ=	 ﾠγ0	 ﾠ+	 ﾠγ1NoLotto	 ﾠ+	 ﾠγ2Market	 ﾠ+	 ﾠγ3Period	 ﾠ+	 ﾠε	 ﾠ+	 ﾠes	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ (3)	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠresults	 ﾠare	 ﾠreported	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright-ﾭ‐hand	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠof	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPositive	 ﾠand	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠ
coefficients	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ treatment	 ﾠ variables	 ﾠ indicate	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ removal	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ lottery	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
introduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠboth	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠhealthy	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtransplant.	 ﾠMarginal	 ﾠ
effects	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupplied	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠa	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠby	 ﾠ34%	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBaseline;	 ﾠwhile,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠby	 ﾠ38%.	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠour	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeliminating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠ
reduces	 ﾠdeaths	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠshortage	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠboth	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupply;	 ﾠwhile,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Market	 ﾠtreatment,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠdeaths	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠon	 ﾠsupply.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠnoting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsee	 ﾠno	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠcrowds	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
altruistic	 ﾠmotives.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Although	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ NoLotto	 ﾠ treatment	 ﾠ saves	 ﾠ lives	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ experimental	 ﾠ environment,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ
reiterate	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ induced	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ highly	 ﾠ stylized	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
powerful	 ﾠ factors	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ individuals’	 ﾠd e c i s i o n s	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ donate	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ culture,	 ﾠ religion,	 ﾠ values,	 ﾠ
beliefs,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠour	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrivial	 ﾠto	 ﾠeliminate	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcost	 ﾠand	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠ
effects,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ practice,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ require	 ﾠ implementing	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ successful	 ﾠ campaign	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
fundamentally	 ﾠchange	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhearts	 ﾠand	 ﾠminds	 ﾠof	 ﾠmillions	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividuals.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠaltering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠ
dimension	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransactions	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠideal,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠunrealistic	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
short	 ﾠrun,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠproposal.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠmatter,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠabstract	 ﾠform.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠour	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠis	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Market	 ﾠtreatment.	 ﾠHere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠis	 ﾠencouraging	 ﾠfor	 ﾠproponents	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠsolution,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠto	 ﾠactually	 ﾠsave	 ﾠlives	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠ
merits	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠexamination.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠwe	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ2	 ﾠand	 ﾠanalyze	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeath	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠin	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠ
detail.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠsalient	 ﾠfact	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdeaths	 ﾠwere	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠby	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupply.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠ9	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠ(11%	 ﾠof	 ﾠperiods)	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠno	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠwas	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtransplant	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠ
treatment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠ7	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcases	 ﾠsick	 ﾠagents	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwere	 ﾠunable	 ﾠto	 ﾠpurchase	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠhealthy	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket.
15	 ﾠOf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ53	 ﾠdeaths	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠtreatment,	 ﾠ25	 ﾠ(47%)	 ﾠresulted	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠinsufficient	 ﾠdemand.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠin	 ﾠ23	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ25	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠall	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ2	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdeaths	 ﾠwere	 ﾠfeasibly	 ﾠavoidable	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsick	 ﾠagent	 ﾠhad	 ﾠchosen	 ﾠto	 ﾠpurchase	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
organ	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ agreeable	 ﾠ price	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ found.	 ﾠ However,	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ remaining	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠ deaths,	 ﾠ 21	 ﾠ
occurred	 ﾠwith	 ﾠboth	 ﾠa	 ﾠbuyer	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠseller	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠ21	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠdied	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
attempted	 ﾠto	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsubmit	 ﾠmutually	 ﾠagreeable	 ﾠprices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠunconsummated	 ﾠtrades	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠdesign.	 ﾠRecall	 ﾠthat	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠall	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠany	 ﾠbids	 ﾠand	 ﾠasks	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransaction	 ﾠ
price	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠoccurred.	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ25	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsick	 ﾠagents	 ﾠchose	 ﾠto	 ﾠplay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
lottery	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠresulted	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠderived	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠor	 ﾠothers’	 ﾠprior	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠ
attempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠpurchase	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠAn	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠat	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠmutually	 ﾠ
agreeable	 ﾠprices	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠhave	 ﾠinduced	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠrecipients	 ﾠto	 ﾠseek	 ﾠout	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ encouraged	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ sellers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ enter	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ market.	 ﾠ Previous	 ﾠ experimental	 ﾠ
research	 ﾠhas	 ﾠshown	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠrepeated	 ﾠbargaining	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠor	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠcommunication	 ﾠ
leadto	 ﾠmore	 ﾠmutually	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠtrades	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠe.g	 ﾠValley	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2002	 ﾠand	 ﾠKetcham	 ﾠet	 ﾠal	 ﾠ1984).	 ﾠ
Thus,	 ﾠif	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠbid	 ﾠand	 ﾠasks	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠyield	 ﾠa	 ﾠmutually	 ﾠagreeable	 ﾠprice,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠpermitted	 ﾠ
subjects	 ﾠto	 ﾠsubmit	 ﾠupdated	 ﾠoffers,	 ﾠor	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠcommunicate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother	 ﾠ
directly,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠdeaths	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠavoided.	 ﾠ
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15	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcompares	 ﾠfavorably	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ65	 ﾠcases	 ﾠ(41%)	 ﾠof	 ﾠzero	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBaseline	 ﾠtreatment,	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠin	 ﾠ42	 ﾠdeaths	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠdemand.	 ﾠA	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠissue	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠand	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠ
buyer	 ﾠand	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsellers.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreal-ﾭ‐world	 ﾠratio	 ﾠof	 ﾠhealthy	 ﾠto	 ﾠsick	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠis	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ2:1,	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠa	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠseller	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠenvironment.	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠon	 ﾠeither	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠcontributed	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠinstitution.	 ﾠPrevious	 ﾠexperimental	 ﾠwork	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠshown	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthicker	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠconverge	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠequilibria	 ﾠmore	 ﾠquickly	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠreliably	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwith	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠsellers	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠSmith	 ﾠand	 ﾠWilliams	 ﾠ1990).	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsense	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
environment	 ﾠwas	 ﾠbiased	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket’s	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠin	 ﾠsaving	 ﾠlives,	 ﾠyet	 ﾠeven	 ﾠso,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
substantial	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupply.	 ﾠ
Results:	 ﾠDistributional	 ﾠConsequences	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠnow	 ﾠturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠpertaining	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistributional	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠfor	 ﾠorgans.	 ﾠRecall,	 ﾠcritics	 ﾠof	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠsolutions	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠshortage	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
decision	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesperate	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠSatz	 ﾠ
2008,	 ﾠ Archard	 ﾠ 2002,	 ﾠ Borna	 ﾠ 1987).	 ﾠ To	 ﾠ test	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ hypothesis	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ induced	 ﾠ persistent	 ﾠ income	 ﾠ
differences	 ﾠacross	 ﾠsubjects,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠask	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠare	 ﾠdisproportionately	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
sell	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠorgans.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Finding	 ﾠ5:	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthan	 ﾠrich	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsale.	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ3	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠsummary	 ﾠstatistics	 ﾠon	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠand	 ﾠacceptance	 ﾠby	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠtype.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
supply	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠfor	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠand	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠsubjects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠtreatment,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠin	 ﾠwillingness	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠis	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠ(27%)	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠ(10%).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Finding	 ﾠ5	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠby	 ﾠmixed-ﾭ‐effects	 ﾠlogistic	 ﾠregression	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrandom	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠcomputed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
subjects	 ﾠ(ei)	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠis	 ﾠSupplyi,t,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠequals	 ﾠ1	 ﾠif	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠi	 ﾠwas	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
supply	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠt	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠ0	 ﾠotherwise.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠis	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠequation	 ﾠ(4)	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
treatment	 ﾠ dummies	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ before	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Poori	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ dichotomous	 ﾠ dummy	 ﾠ variable	 ﾠ indicating	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠi	 ﾠis	 ﾠpoor.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Supplyi,t	 ﾠ=	 ﾠδ0	 ﾠ+	 ﾠδ1NoLotto	 ﾠ+	 ﾠδ2Market	 ﾠ+	 ﾠδ3Poori	 ﾠ+	 ﾠδ4Period	 ﾠ+δ5NoLotto×Poori	 ﾠ+	 ﾠδ6Market×Poori	 ﾠ+	 ﾠε	 ﾠ+	 ﾠei
	 ﾠ (4)	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ4	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠcoefficients	 ﾠand	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestimation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠterm	 ﾠMarket×Poori	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwealthy	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
poor	 ﾠ subjects	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ 17%	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ sell	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ organs	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ rich	 ﾠ subjects.	 ﾠ Insignificant	 ﾠ
coefficients	 ﾠon	 ﾠPoori	 ﾠand	 ﾠNoLottoxPoori	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠno	 ﾠdistributional	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠtreatments.	 ﾠ
Survey	 ﾠResults	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠasked	 ﾠopinions	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠorgan-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠusing	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠscales	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠ
C).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠscales	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠmorality,	 ﾠpreferred	 ﾠlegality,	 ﾠupsetting-ﾭ‐ness,	 ﾠoffensiveness,	 ﾠrationality,	 ﾠ
compassionateness,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsanity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCronbach	 ﾠalpha	 ﾠwas	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠindicating	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠscales	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcapturing	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrespondents’	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
given	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ5	 ﾠgives	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠeach	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠscores	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
bounded	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ1	 ﾠand	 ﾠ5	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠindicating	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfavorable	 ﾠoutlook.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠshows	 ﾠhow	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠattributes	 ﾠand	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠcorrelate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠresponses.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFifty	 ﾠ
four	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrespondents	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmale.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTwenty	 ﾠone	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrespondents	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
Catholic,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ28%	 ﾠreported	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠProtestant	 ﾠand	 ﾠ19%	 ﾠreported	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠaffiliated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠanother	 ﾠ
organized	 ﾠreligion.	 ﾠForty	 ﾠfour	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrespondents	 ﾠrarely	 ﾠwent	 ﾠto	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ
26%	 ﾠwent	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠonce	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
From	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ5,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrespondents	 ﾠhad	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠdonating	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠ
(Behaviors	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ 4),	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ opposed	 ﾠ selling	 ﾠ organs	 ﾠ (Behaviors	 ﾠ 7-ﾭ‐10)	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ taking	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ
permission	 ﾠ(Behaviors	 ﾠ2	 ﾠand	 ﾠ5).	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmore	 ﾠneutral	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ‘compensating’	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠproviders	 ﾠ(Behaviors	 ﾠ3	 ﾠand	 ﾠ6).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisconnect	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
views	 ﾠon	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompensating	 ﾠdesirable	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNot	 ﾠ
surprisingly,	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwho	 ﾠreport	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠlisted	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠdonor	 ﾠhad	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfavorable	 ﾠopinions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
organ	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠat	 ﾠdeath	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠalive	 ﾠ(ρ	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐0.22	 ﾠand	 ﾠρ	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐0.24,	 ﾠrespectively),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
significantly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠfavorable	 ﾠoutlook	 ﾠon	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠfor	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠ
organs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCatholics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠless	 ﾠfavorable	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠof	 ﾠdonating	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeath	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
compensation	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdonations	 ﾠ(ρ	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ0.23	 ﾠand	 ﾠρ	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ0.25,	 ﾠrespectively).	 ﾠ	 ﾠSomewhat	 ﾠsurprisingly,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠreport	 ﾠany	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠaffiliation	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠlive	 ﾠkidney	 ﾠdonations	 ﾠ(ρ	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ0.24),	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠunsurprisingly	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsupportive	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproceeds	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠlive	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
charity	 ﾠ(ρ	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐0.21).	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfind	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠgender	 ﾠdifferences.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAttitudes	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠand	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠhad	 ﾠno	 ﾠcorrelation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBaseline	 ﾠ
environment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwere	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠtreatment,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwillingness	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠ
one’s	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠliving	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠdonate	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠand	 ﾠsell	 ﾠ
organs	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ proceeds	 ﾠ go	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ charity	 ﾠ (ρ	 ﾠ =	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.30	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ ρ	 ﾠ =	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.27,	 ﾠ respectively).	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ
correlated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠtolerance	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠconsent	 ﾠ(ρ	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐0.30	 ﾠand	 ﾠρ	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐0.27,	 ﾠrespectively)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Conclusions	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠ design	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ laboratory	 ﾠ experiment	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ overlapping	 ﾠ generations	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ analyze	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
effects	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠon	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠdonation.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintroduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelimination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
usable	 ﾠ organs	 ﾠ relative	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ baseline	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ presumed	 ﾠ consent	 ﾠ donation.	 ﾠ While	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ NoLotto	 ﾠ
treatment	 ﾠyielded	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeath	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠand	 ﾠethical	 ﾠ
concerns	 ﾠabout	 ﾠtransactions	 ﾠin	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠbe	 ﾠremoved.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠrather	 ﾠ
serves	 ﾠto	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠand	 ﾠethical	 ﾠconcerns,	 ﾠmodeled	 ﾠhere	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠ
avoidable	 ﾠcost,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠand	 ﾠdemand.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
evidence	 ﾠof	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠsupplyin	 ﾠour	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠtreatment,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuitably	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
institution	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠunnecessary	 ﾠdeaths	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠ
shortage.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠand	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
institution,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠis	 ﾠunderstated	 ﾠby	 ﾠour	 ﾠdesign.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ solution	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ incentivizes	 ﾠ individuals	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ taboo	 ﾠ tradeoffs	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
obvious	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠbenefit,	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠlives,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠethical	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠabout	 ﾠviolation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody	 ﾠ
remain	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠaugmented	 ﾠby	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠabout	 ﾠcoercion	 ﾠand	 ﾠequity.	 ﾠA	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠplanner	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠby	 ﾠforcibly	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhealthy	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
recently	 ﾠdeceasedand	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsick,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmany	 ﾠproponents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠ
argue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvoluntary	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠexchange.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear	 ﾠenough,	 ﾠas	 ﾠSatz	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠnotes,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“voluntary”	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠinto	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠdonating	 ﾠis	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠon	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
preferences	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠethical	 ﾠviews	 ﾠon	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠtransactions.	 ﾠIf,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
incentives	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠdifferently,	 ﾠas	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠorgans,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
existence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠmay	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“undue	 ﾠinducement”	 ﾠto	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠindividuals.
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 ﾠ
Furthermore,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠwith	 ﾠunequal	 ﾠdistributional	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠcould	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠperceptions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
rich	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠare	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠharvesting	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoor.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠour	 ﾠenvironment,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnote	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
difference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurvival	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠrich	 ﾠand	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠagents	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠno	 ﾠagent	 ﾠis	 ﾠunable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
afford	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠor	 ﾠshe	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠpurchase	 ﾠone.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
price	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠcould	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠprice	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠ
exacerbating	 ﾠethical	 ﾠconcerns.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠthat	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠby	 ﾠincentivizing	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ minimizing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ethical	 ﾠ costs.	 ﾠ Coffman	 ﾠ (2009)	 ﾠ shows	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ ethically	 ﾠ questionable	 ﾠ
actions	 ﾠare	 ﾠdeemed	 ﾠless	 ﾠworthy	 ﾠof	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠthird-ﾭ‐party	 ﾠagent.	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonopsonist	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcompensates	 ﾠvoluntary	 ﾠdonors	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠdonating	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan.	 ﾠIntroducing	 ﾠa	 ﾠthird	 ﾠparty	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransaction	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠan	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠcompany	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠagency)	 ﾠand	 ﾠeliminating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠsale	 ﾠof	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠcould	 ﾠallay	 ﾠethical	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠby	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠis	 ﾠappropriately	 ﾠcompensated.
17Jasper	 ﾠet	 ﾠ
al	 ﾠ (2004),	 ﾠ Haddow	 ﾠ (2006),	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Halpern,	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al	 ﾠ (2010)	 ﾠ analyzed	 ﾠ attitudes	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ similar	 ﾠ
proposals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsurveys	 ﾠof	 ﾠmedical	 ﾠprofessionals	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠpublic,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠresults,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
little	 ﾠdata	 ﾠexists	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠto	 ﾠbase	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠprescription.	 ﾠFuture	 ﾠexperiments	 ﾠcan	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠdata	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmechanisms.	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠour	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠ
deceased	 ﾠ donations	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ futures	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ hope	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ work	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ utilize	 ﾠ experiments	 ﾠ
incorporating	 ﾠlive	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠand	 ﾠspot	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠfor	 ﾠorgans.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠEffects	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 ﾠDeaths,	 ﾠDemand	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 ﾠSupply	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 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Logistic	 ﾠregression,	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠin	 ﾠparentheses,	 ﾠclustered	 ﾠby	 ﾠSession.	 ﾠ
***	 ﾠ	 ﾠ p<	 ﾠ0.001	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ **	 ﾠ p<	 ﾠ0.01	 ﾠ
*	 ﾠ p<	 ﾠ0.05	 ﾠ




Table	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠSummary	 ﾠData	 ﾠby	 ﾠTreatment	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Treatment	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Baseline	 ﾠ NoLotto	 ﾠ Market	 ﾠ
Sessions	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
Periods	 ﾠ 160	 ﾠ 80	 ﾠ 80	 ﾠ
Died	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 87	 ﾠ(54%)	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ(25%)	 ﾠ 53	 ﾠ(66%)	 ﾠ
Periods	 ﾠDemanded	 ﾠ 115	 ﾠ(72%)	 ﾠ 70	 ﾠ(88%)	 ﾠ 55	 ﾠ(69%)	 ﾠ
Periods	 ﾠSupplied	 ﾠ 95	 ﾠ(56%)	 ﾠ 69	 ﾠ(86%)	 ﾠ 71	 ﾠ(89%)	 ﾠ
Periods	 ﾠwith	 ﾠExcess	 ﾠDemand	 ﾠ 42	 ﾠ(26%)	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ(13%)	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ(09%)	 ﾠ
Periods	 ﾠwith	 ﾠExcess	 ﾠSupply	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ(19%)	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ(11%)	 ﾠ 23(29%)	 ﾠ









Table	 ﾠ3:	 ﾠDonation	 ﾠand	 ﾠAcceptance	 ﾠStatistics	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ No	 ﾠLotto	 ﾠTreatment	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Market	 ﾠTreatment	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Lotto	 ﾠ No	 ﾠLotto	 ﾠ Change	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ No	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠ Market	 ﾠ Change	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Rich	 ﾠAccept	 ﾠ 31	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 23	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Average	 ﾠRich	 ﾠBid	 ﾠ
Rich	 ﾠSick	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 38	 ﾠ 32	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 36	 ﾠ 42	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 298.6	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
%Rich	 ﾠAccept	 ﾠ 81.6%	 ﾠ 90.6%	 ﾠ 0.090	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 63.9%	 ﾠ 59.5%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.044	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Poor	 ﾠAccept	 ﾠ 32	 ﾠ 41	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Average	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠBid	 ﾠ
Poor	 ﾠSick	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 42	 ﾠ 48	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 44	 ﾠ 38	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 236.3	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
%	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠAccept	 ﾠ 76.2%	 ﾠ 85.4%	 ﾠ 0.092	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 65.9%	 ﾠ 78.9%	 ﾠ 0.130	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Rich	 ﾠDonate	 ﾠ 32	 ﾠ 62	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 34	 ﾠ 37	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Average	 ﾠRich	 ﾠAsk	 ﾠ
Rich	 ﾠOld	 ﾠand	 ﾠHealthy	 ﾠ 80	 ﾠ 89	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 84	 ﾠ 74	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 259.4	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
%Rich	 ﾠDonate	 ﾠ 40.0%	 ﾠ 69.7%	 ﾠ 0.297	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 40.5%	 ﾠ 50.0%	 ﾠ 0.095	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Poor	 ﾠDonate	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ 42	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠ 55	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Average	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠAsk	 ﾠ
Poor	 ﾠOld	 ﾠand	 ﾠHealthy	 ﾠ 80	 ﾠ 71	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 76	 ﾠ 86	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 284.5	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
%Poor	 ﾠDonate	 ﾠ 37.5%	 ﾠ 59.2%	 ﾠ 0.217	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 36.8%	 ﾠ 64.0%	 ﾠ 0.271	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ4:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠPoverty	 ﾠon	 ﾠDonation	 ﾠ




































	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Logistic	 ﾠregression,	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠin	 ﾠparentheses.	 ﾠ
***	 ﾠ	 ﾠ p<	 ﾠ0.001	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ **	 ﾠ p<	 ﾠ0.01	 ﾠ
*	 ﾠ p<	 ﾠ0.05	 ﾠ
+	 ﾠ p<	 ﾠ0.1	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ5:	 ﾠAnalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠSurvey	 ﾠResponses	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ






















1.  Donating	 ﾠa	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTime	 ﾠof	 ﾠDeath	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 1.63	 ﾠ 0.79	 ﾠ 0.17	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.10	 ﾠ 0.23	 ﾠ 0.08	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.22	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.04	 ﾠ 0.01	 ﾠ
2.  Taking	 ﾠa	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTime	 ﾠof	 ﾠDeath	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠExplicit	 ﾠPermission	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 3.56	 ﾠ 0.91	 ﾠ 0.20	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.08	 ﾠ 0.19	 ﾠ 0.08	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.18	 ﾠ 0.00	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.30	 ﾠ
3.  Paying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFamily	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTime	 ﾠof	 ﾠDeath	 ﾠin	 ﾠReturn	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 2.70	 ﾠ 0.88	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.17	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.03	 ﾠ 0.25	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.17	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.01	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.01	 ﾠ 0.00	 ﾠ
4.  Donating	 ﾠa	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠAlive	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 2.09	 ﾠ 0.88	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.20	 ﾠ 0.24	 ﾠ 0.03	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.16	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.24	 ﾠ 0.00	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.30	 ﾠ
5.  Taking	 ﾠa	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠLiving	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠExplicit	 ﾠPermission	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 4.44	 ﾠ 0.83	 ﾠ 0.15	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.11	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.01	 ﾠ 0.12	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.15	 ﾠ 0.09	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.27	 ﾠ
6.  Paying	 ﾠa	 ﾠLiving	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠin	 ﾠReturn	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 3.06	 ﾠ 0.91	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.18	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.05	 ﾠ 0.00	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.12	 ﾠ 0.11	 ﾠ 0.07	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.21	 ﾠ
7.  Selling	 ﾠa	 ﾠDead	 ﾠPerson's	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠon	 ﾠeBay	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 4.40	 ﾠ 0.9	 ﾠ 0.05	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.20	 ﾠ 0.09	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.01	 ﾠ 0.02	 ﾠ 0.06	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.09	 ﾠ
8.  Selling	 ﾠa	 ﾠDead	 ﾠPerson's	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠand	 ﾠGiving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEarnings	 ﾠto	 ﾠCharity	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 3.84	 ﾠ 0.92	 ﾠ 0.03	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.18	 ﾠ 0.01	 ﾠ 0.03	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.01	 ﾠ 0.09	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.15	 ﾠ
9.  Selling	 ﾠa	 ﾠLiving	 ﾠPerson's	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠon	 ﾠeBay	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 4.36	 ﾠ 0.9	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.02	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.12	 ﾠ 0.02	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.02	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.02	 ﾠ 0.11	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.17	 ﾠ
10.  Selling	 ﾠa	 ﾠLiving	 ﾠPerson's	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠon	 ﾠeBay	 ﾠand	 ﾠGiving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMoney	 ﾠto	 ﾠCharity	 ﾠ
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"Appendix	 ﾠA:	 ﾠExperiment	 ﾠInstructions	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ experiment	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ decision-ﾭ‐making.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ You	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ paid	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ cash	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ end	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
experiment	 ﾠ based	 ﾠ upon	 ﾠ your	 ﾠ decisions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ decisions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ others,	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ you	 ﾠ
understand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirections	 ﾠcompletely.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAll	 ﾠpayoffs	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠcents,	 ﾠso	 ﾠ100	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ$1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠ point,	 ﾠ please	 ﾠ raise	 ﾠ your	 ﾠ hand	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ someone	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ come	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ you.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Otherwise,	 ﾠ you	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
communicate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠanyone	 ﾠelse	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiment.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠis	 ﾠbroken	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠperiods.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠany	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠ3	 ﾠyoung,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠold	 ﾠand	 ﾠ4	 ﾠinactive	 ﾠ
people.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠold,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠold	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠinactive,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ3	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinactive	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ
become	 ﾠyoung.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhich	 ﾠinactive	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠis	 ﾠrandomly	 ﾠdetermined,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
inactive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠafter	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠold	 ﾠand	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠbecoming	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠagain.	 ﾠNotice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠinactive	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠthan	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠso	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinactive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠperiods.	 ﾠ
Young	 ﾠand	 ﾠold	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠearn	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠby	 ﾠholding	 ﾠassets	 ﾠ(shown	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscreen	 ﾠas	 ﾠcolored	 ﾠballs).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
three	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠassets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRed	 ﾠassets	 ﾠlast	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ1	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠworth	 ﾠ0	 ﾠto	 ﾠeveryone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠYellow	 ﾠAssets	 ﾠlast	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ
period	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠbecoming	 ﾠRed	 ﾠassets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠGreen	 ﾠassets	 ﾠlast	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ2	 ﾠperiods,	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠbecoming	 ﾠYellow	 ﾠassets	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ3
rd	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEach	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠstart	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠGreen	 ﾠasset	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠperson	 ﾠstarts	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
Yellow	 ﾠAsset.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠrandomly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNotice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠGreen	 ﾠasset	 ﾠlasts	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠthan	 ﾠits	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠowner	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠuse	 ﾠit	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠearn	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠor	 ﾠold,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠinactive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠwealthy	 ﾠand	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠpeople.	 ﾠ	 ﾠYour	 ﾠtype	 ﾠis	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠrandomly	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
change	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠexperiment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1)	 ﾠ Wealthy	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ earn	 ﾠ 800	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ holding	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ Yellow	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ Green	 ﾠ asset	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ young.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2)	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠearn	 ﾠ200	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠYellow	 ﾠor	 ﾠGreen	 ﾠasset	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠyoung.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Green	 ﾠand	 ﾠYellow	 ﾠassets	 ﾠare	 ﾠalways	 ﾠworth	 ﾠ500	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠold	 ﾠperson,	 ﾠregardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperson	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
Wealthy	 ﾠor	 ﾠPoor.	 ﾠ	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠnever	 ﾠhave	 ﾠRed	 ﾠassets	 ﾠand	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhold	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠone	 ﾠasset.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Here	 ﾠare	 ﾠscreen	 ﾠimages	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠGreen	 ﾠAsset	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠan	 ﾠOld	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠYellow	 ﾠAsset	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Period	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠare	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtable	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbottom	 ﾠright	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscreen	 ﾠ(earnings	 ﾠare	 ﾠupdated	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
period	 ﾠends).	 ﾠ	 ﾠGreen	 ﾠrows	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠactive	 ﾠperiods.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSince	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠcycle	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠyoung,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠold,	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠinactive,	 ﾠactive	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠcome	 ﾠin	 ﾠpairs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠis	 ﾠcompleted,	 ﾠone	 ﾠpair	 ﾠof	 ﾠactive	 ﾠ
periods	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrandomly	 ﾠselected	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠyour	 ﾠpayoff.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠYou	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠearn	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠasset	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠyou	 ﾠare	 ﾠinactive;	 ﾠnor	 ﾠcan	 ﾠyou	 ﾠkeep	 ﾠit	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠyou	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠ
young	 ﾠagain.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠyou	 ﾠare	 ﾠold	 ﾠand	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠGreen	 ﾠasset,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠor	 ﾠyou	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ“Donate	 ﾠMy	 ﾠ
Asset.”	 ﾠDonating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠasset	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠcan	 ﾠuse	 ﾠyour	 ﾠasset	 ﾠnext	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRegardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
old	 ﾠperson	 ﾠdonates	 ﾠher	 ﾠasset,	 ﾠshe	 ﾠearns	 ﾠ500	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠshe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
old.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠold	 ﾠperson	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠinactive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
“Donate	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠIf	 ﾠyou	 ﾠwant,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠby	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠ“Confirm	 ﾠChoice.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠyou	 ﾠwant	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠyou	 ﾠmust	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠclick	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠoption	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠclick	 ﾠ“Confirm	 ﾠChoice”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif)	 ﾠan	 ﾠold	 ﾠperson	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠguess	 ﾠa	 ﾠrandom	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ0	 ﾠand	 ﾠ999,	 ﾠinclusive,	 ﾠto	 ﾠearn	 ﾠ10,000	 ﾠ(that	 ﾠis	 ﾠUS$100).	 ﾠ	 ﾠYou	 ﾠenter	 ﾠa	 ﾠguess	 ﾠby	 ﾠtyping	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbox	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠeach	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
winning	 ﾠnumber.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠasset	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ“Accept	 ﾠNew	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠoption)	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠAccepting	 ﾠan	 ﾠasset	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠan	 ﾠold	 ﾠperson	 ﾠdonates	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠasset	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠperson	 ﾠcould	 ﾠuse	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠearn	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠ
period	 ﾠafter	 ﾠbecoming	 ﾠold.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwho	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠopts	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
Asset”	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠguess	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ0	 ﾠand	 ﾠ999,	 ﾠinclusive,	 ﾠto	 ﾠwin	 ﾠ
10,000.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEither	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconfirmed	 ﾠby	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Confirm	 ﾠChoice”	 ﾠbutton.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠasset	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠhe	 ﾠautomatically	 ﾠkeeps	 ﾠhis	 ﾠasset),	 ﾠnor	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠold	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠor	 ﾠred	 ﾠasset	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠthis	 ﾠasset	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠperiod).	 ﾠ	 ﾠInactive	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠ(poor)	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠA	 ﾠis	 ﾠold	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ6	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(wealthy)	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠis	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ6.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Example	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠPeriod	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠA	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
“Donate	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠand	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
“Accept	 ﾠNew	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Here	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠA	 ﾠdonates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠto	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
No	 ﾠone	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchance	 ﾠto	 ﾠearn	 ﾠ10,000.	 ﾠ
Period	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠA	 ﾠis	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠ B	 ﾠis	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠ Young	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ200	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠInactive	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠ Old	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ800	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠ Inactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠOld	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Example	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠPeriod	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠA	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
“Donate	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠand	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Here	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠchance	 ﾠto	 ﾠearn	 ﾠ10,000.	 ﾠ
Period	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠA	 ﾠis	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠ B	 ﾠis	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠ Young	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ200	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠInactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠ Old	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ800	 ﾠ+	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠchance	 ﾠat	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ10,000	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠ Inactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠOld	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ
Once	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcompleted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirections	 ﾠand	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠyour	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠare	 ﾠanswered,	 ﾠplease	 ﾠpress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Enter	 ﾠ
ID”	 ﾠbutton	 ﾠand	 ﾠenter	 ﾠyour	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠID.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdone	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrief	 ﾠquiz,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠyour	 ﾠpayoff	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠway.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquiz	 ﾠis	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠsure	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠunderstands	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
experiment	 ﾠworks	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠpayoffs	 ﾠare	 ﾠdetermined.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠafter	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
completed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhandout	 ﾠand	 ﾠhad	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠchecked	 ﾠby	 ﾠan	 ﾠexperimenter.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNo	 ﾠLotto	 ﾠTreatment	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠnext	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠcompleted.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠan	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠguess	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠand	 ﾠearn	 ﾠ10,000	 ﾠif	 ﾠyou	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠ(poor)	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠA	 ﾠis	 ﾠold	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ6	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(wealthy)	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠis	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ6.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Example	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠPeriod	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠA	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ“Donate	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠand	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
chooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Accept	 ﾠNew	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Here	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠreceives	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠdonated	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
Person	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Period	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠA	 ﾠis	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠ B	 ﾠis	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠ Young	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ200	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠInactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠ Old	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ800	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠ Inactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠOld	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Example	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠPeriod	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠA	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ“Donate	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠand	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
chooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Here	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset.	 ﾠ
Period	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠA	 ﾠis	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠ B	 ﾠis	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠ Young	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ200	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠInactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠ Old	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ800	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠ Inactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠOld	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ
Once	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcompleted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirections	 ﾠand	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠyour	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠare	 ﾠanswered,	 ﾠplease	 ﾠwait	 ﾠquietly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠwill	 ﾠresume	 ﾠonce	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcompleted	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdirections.	 ﾠ	 ﾠKeep	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠpair	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠactive	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrandomly	 ﾠselected	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠyour	 ﾠpayoff.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Market/Lotto	 ﾠTreatment	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠnext	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠcompleted.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
instead	 ﾠof	 ﾠassets	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠdonated,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠand	 ﾠsell	 ﾠassets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠold	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠasset	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
now	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“Sell	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠa	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠasset	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
choose	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“Buy	 ﾠAn	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnyone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠwill	 ﾠstill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
chance	 ﾠto	 ﾠearn	 ﾠ10,000	 ﾠby	 ﾠguessing	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ0	 ﾠto	 ﾠ999,	 ﾠinclusive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Old	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠasset	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmake	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠby	 ﾠtyping	 ﾠit	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbox	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠ“Sell	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ
Young	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠasset	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmake	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠby	 ﾠtyping	 ﾠit	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbox	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠ“Buy	 ﾠAn	 ﾠ
Asset.”	 ﾠOffers	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠand	 ﾠsell	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinteger	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ0	 ﾠand	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠ
person	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ asset	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ he	 ﾠ becomes	 ﾠ old).	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ You	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ press	 ﾠ “Confirm	 ﾠ Choice”	 ﾠ after	 ﾠ making	 ﾠ your	 ﾠ
decision.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠof	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠthings	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhappen	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠselects	 ﾠ“Sell	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠor	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠselects	 ﾠ“Buy	 ﾠAn	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠno	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
price	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠis	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠall	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠagain	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠno	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠno	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠprice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠis	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
offer	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlowest	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠbuyer	 ﾠpays	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠold	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
lowest	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠin	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠfor	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠis	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠboth	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
sell.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠbuyer	 ﾠpays	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprice	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠold	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmade	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlowest	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠfor	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠasset	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
After	 ﾠeach	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠprice,	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠexists,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠor	 ﾠsell.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠwill	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmade	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠoffer.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠare	 ﾠthree	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠoccur.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠ(poor)	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠA	 ﾠis	 ﾠold	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠ
(wealthy)	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠis	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(wealthy)	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠC	 ﾠis	 ﾠold	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ6.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Example	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠPeriod	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠA	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Sell	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠof	 ﾠ300,	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠ
chooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Buy	 ﾠAn	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ400,	 ﾠand	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠC	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Here	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ400	 ﾠ>	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠof	 ﾠ300	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠis	 ﾠ350	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(the	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠ400	 ﾠand	 ﾠ300)	 ﾠand	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠbuys	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Person	 ﾠC	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchance	 ﾠto	 ﾠearn	 ﾠ10,000	 ﾠsince	 ﾠC	 ﾠchose	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Period	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠA	 ﾠ(Seller)	 ﾠis	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠ B	 ﾠ(Buyer)	 ﾠis	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠ C	 ﾠis	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠ Young	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ200	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠInactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ Young	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ800	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠ Old	 ﾠ+	 ﾠPrice	 ﾠ
500	 ﾠ+	 ﾠ350	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ850	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠPrice	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ800	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ350	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ450	 ﾠ
Old	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ+	 ﾠchance	 ﾠat	 ﾠ10,000	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠ Inactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠOld	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ Inactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Example	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠPeriod	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠA	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Sell	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠof	 ﾠ300,	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠ
chooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Buy	 ﾠAn	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ200,	 ﾠand	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠC	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Here	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ200	 ﾠ<	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠof	 ﾠ300	 ﾠso	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠprice	 ﾠand	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Person	 ﾠC	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchance	 ﾠto	 ﾠearn	 ﾠ10,000	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠC	 ﾠchose	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Period	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠA	 ﾠis	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠ B	 ﾠis	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠ C	 ﾠis	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠ Young	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ200	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠInactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ Young	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ800	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠ Old	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ800	 ﾠ Old	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ+	 ﾠchance	 ﾠat	 ﾠ10,000	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠ Inactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠOld	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ Inactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Example	 ﾠ3:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠPeriod	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠA	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Sell	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠof	 ﾠ300,	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠ
chooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Buy	 ﾠAn	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ400,	 ﾠand	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠC	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Sell	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
offer	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$350.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ400	 ﾠ>	 ﾠboth	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠof	 ﾠ350	 ﾠand	 ﾠ300.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
price	 ﾠis	 ﾠ325	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠ300	 ﾠand	 ﾠ350)	 ﾠand	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠB	 ﾠbuys	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNo	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchance	 ﾠto	 ﾠearn	 ﾠ10,000	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠchose	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Period	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠA	 ﾠ(seller)	 ﾠis	 ﾠPoor	 ﾠ B	 ﾠ(buyer)	 ﾠis	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠ C	 ﾠis	 ﾠWealthy	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠ Young	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ200	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠInactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ Young	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ800	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠ Old	 ﾠ+	 ﾠPrice	 ﾠ
500	 ﾠ+	 ﾠ325	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ825	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠ	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠPrice	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ800	 ﾠ	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ325	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ475	 ﾠ
Old	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠ Inactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠOld	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ Inactive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Once	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcompleted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirections	 ﾠand	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠyour	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠare	 ﾠanswered,	 ﾠplease	 ﾠwait	 ﾠquietly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠwill	 ﾠresume	 ﾠonce	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcompleted	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdirections.	 ﾠ	 ﾠKeep	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠpair	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠactive	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrandomly	 ﾠselected	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠyour	 ﾠpayoff.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠB:	 ﾠQuiz	 ﾠQuestions	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠA	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠasset	 ﾠlasts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmany	 ﾠperiods?	 ﾠ
a.  1	 ﾠPeriod	 ﾠ
b.  2	 ﾠPeriods,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠa	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠasset	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ1	 ﾠmore	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ
c.  3	 ﾠPeriods	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠHow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠagent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠred	 ﾠasset	 ﾠearn	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠperiod?	 ﾠ
a.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ
b.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 200	 ﾠ
c.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 500	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠHow	 ﾠmany	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠwill	 ﾠan	 ﾠagent	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinactive	 ﾠafter	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠold?	 ﾠ
a.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
b.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ
c.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Unknown,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠAgents	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhold	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠone	 ﾠasset	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ
a.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ True	 ﾠ
b.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ False	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠan	 ﾠold	 ﾠagent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠasset	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠagent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠasset	 ﾠmay	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠ
Asset”.	 ﾠ
a.  True	 ﾠ
b.  False	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
6.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠan	 ﾠold	 ﾠagent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠasset	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Donate	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠagent	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠguess	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ0	 ﾠand	 ﾠ999	 ﾠin	 ﾠhopes	 ﾠof	 ﾠearning	 ﾠ$100.	 ﾠ
a.  True	 ﾠ
b.  False	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
7.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠa	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠagent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠasset	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠagent	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunable	 ﾠto	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠdonated	 ﾠasset.	 ﾠ
a.  True	 ﾠ
b.  False	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠNoLotto	 ﾠAlternate	 ﾠQuestions	 ﾠ
6.	 ﾠOld	 ﾠagents	 ﾠwith	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠassets	 ﾠmay	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Donate	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”	 ﾠto	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠagents	 ﾠwith	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠassets.	 ﾠ
a.  True	 ﾠ
b.  False	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
7.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠa	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠagent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠyellow	 ﾠasset	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Keep	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠagent	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunable	 ﾠto	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠdonated	 ﾠasset.	 ﾠ
a.  True	 ﾠ
b.  False	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Market	 ﾠAlternate	 ﾠQuestions	 ﾠ
6.	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠan	 ﾠold	 ﾠagent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠasset	 ﾠmay	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Sell	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”.	 ﾠ
a.  True	 ﾠ
b.  False	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
7.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠan	 ﾠold	 ﾠagent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠasset	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“Sell	 ﾠMy	 ﾠAsset”,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠagent	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠguess	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ0	 ﾠand	 ﾠ999	 ﾠin	 ﾠhopes	 ﾠof	 ﾠearning	 ﾠ$100.	 ﾠ
a.  True	 ﾠ
b.  False	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠC:	 ﾠSurvey	 ﾠQuestions	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1)	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠyour	 ﾠgender?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Male	 ﾠ Female	 ﾠ
2)	 ﾠHow	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠyour	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠaffiliation?	 ﾠ





	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
3)	 ﾠHow	 ﾠoften	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠattend	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠservices?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠNever	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠRarely	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠMonthly	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWeekly	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠMore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠa	 ﾠWeek	 ﾠ
4)	 ﾠIs	 ﾠthere	 ﾠanyone	 ﾠin	 ﾠyour	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠor	 ﾠanyone	 ﾠof	 ﾠyour	 ﾠclose	 ﾠfriends	 ﾠwho	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠor	 ﾠdonated	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan?	 ﾠY/N	 ﾠ
5)	 ﾠAre	 ﾠyou	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠlisted	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠorgan	 ﾠdonor?	 ﾠY/N	 ﾠ
6)	 ﾠRate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠbehaviors	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscales	 ﾠbelow:	 ﾠ
Donating	 ﾠa	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTime	 ﾠof	 ﾠDeath	 ﾠ
Taking	 ﾠa	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTime	 ﾠof	 ﾠDeath	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠExplicit	 ﾠPermission	 ﾠ
Paying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFamily	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTime	 ﾠof	 ﾠDeath	 ﾠin	 ﾠReturn	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠ
Donating	 ﾠa	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠAlive	 ﾠ
Taking	 ﾠa	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠLiving	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠExplicit	 ﾠPermission	 ﾠ
Paying	 ﾠa	 ﾠLiving	 ﾠPerson	 ﾠin	 ﾠReturn	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠ
Selling	 ﾠa	 ﾠDead	 ﾠPerson's	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠon	 ﾠeBay	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Selling	 ﾠa	 ﾠDead	 ﾠPerson's	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠand	 ﾠGiving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEarnings	 ﾠto	 ﾠCharity	 ﾠ
Selling	 ﾠa	 ﾠLiving	 ﾠPerson's	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠon	 ﾠeBay	 ﾠ
Selling	 ﾠa	 ﾠLiving	 ﾠPerson's	 ﾠKidney	 ﾠon	 ﾠeBay	 ﾠand	 ﾠGiving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMoney	 ﾠto	 ﾠCharity	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Scales:	 ﾠ
Highly	 ﾠMoral	 ﾠ Somewhat	 ﾠMoral	 ﾠ Unsure	 ﾠ Somewhat	 ﾠImmoral	 ﾠ Highly	 ﾠImmoral	 ﾠ
Should	 ﾠBe	 ﾠ
Banned	 ﾠ
Banned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠMinor	 ﾠ
Exceptions	 ﾠ
Permitted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠMajor	 ﾠ
Restrictions	 ﾠ





Upsetting	 ﾠ Very	 ﾠUpsetting	 ﾠ Moderately	 ﾠUpsetting	 ﾠ Not	 ﾠVery	 ﾠUpsetting	 ﾠ
Not	 ﾠUpsetting	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
All	 ﾠ
Not	 ﾠat	 ﾠAll	 ﾠ
Offensive	 ﾠ Not	 ﾠVery	 ﾠOffensive	 ﾠ Moderately	 ﾠOffensive	 ﾠ Very	 ﾠOffensive	 ﾠ
Extremely	 ﾠ
Offensive	 ﾠ




Compassionate	 ﾠ Neutral	 ﾠ Somewhat	 ﾠCruel	 ﾠ Very	 ﾠCruel	 ﾠ
Completely	 ﾠCrazy	 ﾠ Somewhat	 ﾠCrazy	 ﾠ Neutral	 ﾠ Somewhat	 ﾠSane	 ﾠ Completely	 ﾠSane	 ﾠ
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